Introduction
The regulation of nuclear power development and radiation risks in South Korea began with the principle of legal reservation, following the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act in 1958 [1]. Radiation risk issues caused significant social repercussions following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident. As a result, after 53 years, the Atomic Energy Act, which had combined both nuclear development and regulation, was split into the Nuclear Energy Promotion Act and the Nuclear Safety Act [2, 3]. In response to the public’s growing demand for safety management concerning radiation risks, several laws related to the regulation of radiation risks have been enacted, amended, or new provisions have been introduced. These changes have become new policy and administrative objectives aimed at improving the safety management of radiation risks and enhancing public trust. There have been various criticisms regarding the safety of nuclear power generation, which inherently involves a particularly high level of radiation risk. Concerns about the safety of nuclear power generation have led to a significant increase in comparative legal studies on nuclear related legal systems by numerous legal scholars. The majority of research has focused on comparative law related to the safety of nuclear power generation or the legal framework of South Korea’s Nuclear Safety Act [4–31]. Legal studies have also been conducted on topics such as spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste [32–46], and nuclear liability law [11, 47–52].
However, these studies are not focused on radiation risk regulation. The core risk of nuclear power plants lies in radiation exposure resulting from radioactive contamination and dispersion. Therefore, in order to understand the legal framework for regulating radiation risks, it is essential to analyze the individual laws related to all types of radiation risk regulation. The state’s duty to protect fundamental rights is realized through legislation [53]. Radiation risks are present in various sectors, including nuclear power plants, medical, industrial, security, and research fields, as well as natural radiation and radioactive products [54]. In the case of a high-grade nuclear power plant accident, substantial losses and damage to human health or the environment may occur. In contrast, accidents involving radioactive materials in industries unrelated to nuclear power plants occur more frequently and in a greater variety of forms. Although it has been a century since the introduction of radiation technology in South Korea, research on radiation safety management has primarily been conducted by groups of nuclear and radiation experts. As a result, there has been little public law research on radiation risk regulation to date, raising concerns about whether the laws related to radiation risk regulation established in the past can adequately protect public safety in the present and future. This study aims to analyze the individual laws regulating radiation risks in South Korea in order to understand the legal framework for radiation risk regulation and to propose improvements necessary for effective radiation risk regulation.
Materials and Methods
This study is qualitative in nature. Beginning with the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act in 1958, individual laws regulating risks related to radiation exposure—including radiation, radiation-generating devices, radioactive materials, nuclear power, nuclear fuel, and radioactive waste—were identified through consultations, searches, and practical experience. To enhance the reliability of the process of systematizing the sporadically enacted laws, a verification process was conducted through expert consultations with relevant administrative departments. Current laws related to radiation risk regulation were identified using the legal information center’s search engine (https://law.go.kr/). In addition, previous studies related to radiation risk regulation were also reviewed. The search terms included radiation, radioactive materials, radiation-generating devices, radioactive isotopes, nuclear fuel, reactors, radioactive waste, and specific radioactive isotopes (tritium, radon, cesium, iodine, and strontium), among others.
As a result, first, a total of 31 individual laws related to radiation risk were identified. Second, the objectives of each law, the scope of radiation risk regulation, and the responsible administrative departments were organized. Third, the structure of the current legal framework for radiation risk regulation was outlined. All individual laws were categorized based on their titles, enactment dates, and amendments as of April 2024. One limitation of this study is that, due to the historical background of South Korea’s legislative process, which did not consider systematic coherence, it is not possible to claim that all radiation risk-related laws were fully identified. Specifically, laws related to national defense and nuclear weapons were excluded from the scope of this study.
The key legal terms used in this study are as follows: (1) A fundamental law refers to a primary legal framework that provides the basic principles and direction for all subordinate laws and regulations in a specific field. It serves as the foundational legal foundation upon which other legal rules and regulations are built. (2) Administrative discretion refers to the authority granted to public agencies or administrative bodies to make decisions when applying laws or regulations. It allows flexibility in the implementation of laws, enabling decision-makers to adjust the application of rules to specific situations or cases. (3) A legal normative system refers to a systematic framework of laws, regulations, institutions, and legal procedures that structure the legal order within a society. It encompasses the legal principles and standards that govern behavior, providing the framework for the application and interpretation of laws. The legal normative system plays a crucial role in maintaining social order and ensuring justice within a society.
Results
1. Legal Framework for Radiation Risk Regulation in South Korea
Laws related to radiation risk regulation can be broadly classified into two categories, as shown in Fig. 1. The regulatory framework can be categorized into two systems: the Nuclear Safety Act and laws other than the Nuclear Safety Act. Although the Nuclear Safety Act is not formally classified as a fundamental law, it exhibits characteristics typically associated with such laws. In contrast, the other laws, while related to radiation safety, do not possess the characteristics of a fundamental law and are thus considered individual statutes.
The Nuclear Safety Act is interlinked with various individual laws in the following ways. First, it is connected to four individual laws related to promotion under the Ministry of Science and ICT. Second, in terms of regulatory organizations, it is linked to the Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety Act. Third, in the event of a disaster, it is systematically associated with the Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency and the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Nuclear Liability. Fourth, to enhance public trust and participation, the Act on the Control and Supervision on Nuclear Power Supplies, etc. for the Prevention of Corruption in the Nuclear Power Industry and the Act on Nuclear Safety Information Disclosure and Communication, which were established following the Fukushima nuclear accident, are also interconnected with the Nuclear Safety Act. Fifth, in terms of post-incident measures, the occurrence of disasters and accidents under the Nuclear Safety Act is systematically related to the Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency, the Framework Act on Disaster and Safety Management, and the Anti-Terrorism Act for the Protection of Citizens and Public Safety. In contrast, individual laws related to radiation risk regulation, excluding the Nuclear Safety Act, have the following characteristics. First, there are no existing laws related to the promotion of radiation technology. Second, there is a lack of specialized regulatory organizations for radiation risk management. Third, there is no established system for responding to accidents and disasters. Fourth, the scope of safety management for radioactive materials, beyond the scope of the Nuclear Safety Act, is limited to functions related to measurement and verification.
The Nuclear Safety Act is linked to laws related to development and promotion, specialized administrative organizations, accident response, and public participation, thereby forming a comprehensive regulatory framework, as shown in Fig. 1. However, the individual laws regulating radiation risks, excluding the Nuclear Safety Act, lack specialized administrative organizations for risk measurement and assessment. Consequently, the legal framework for regulating radiation risks in South Korea appears to be classified into two categories. One for regulating the risks associated with nuclear power generation and another for regulating radiation risks unrelated to nuclear power plants.
2. Laws on Regulation by Radiation Risk Level
The government bears the responsibility of protecting the safety of its citizens from the risks arising from the use of radiation technology. The government enforces stringent regulations through individual laws, such as the Nuclear Safety Act, the Medical Service Act, and the Veterinarians Act, to manage the relatively high radiation risks associated with the use of radiation technology and effectively fulfill this responsibility. To manage the relatively low levels of radiation risk associated with naturally occurring radioactive materials in the environment, relatively lenient regulations are enforced under individual laws such as the Drinking Water Management Act, the Indoor Air Quality Management Act, the Agricultural and Fishery Product Quality Management Act, the Marine Environment Management Act, and the Act on Protective Action Guidelines against Radiation in the Natural Environment. To prevent disasters that might have a low probability of occurrence but entail high levels of radiation risk, preventive regulations are enforced under laws such as the Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency, the Framework Act on Disaster and Safety Management, and the Anti-Terrorism Act for the Protection of Citizens and Public Safety.
1) Relatively high-level risks: laws regulated to the risk management in the use of radiation technology
The Nuclear Safety Act is a specific piece of legislation designed to regulate radiation sources with relatively high-risk levels, such as those characterized by the intensity of radiation energy and the properties of radioactive materials. The Nuclear Safety Act is not a fundamental law for regulating radiation risks, but it possesses a fundamental legislative character. It reflects the Basic Safety Standards (BSS) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its radiation protection regulations are based on the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). However, this law does not incorporate all of the latest standards set by the ICRP. It has the purpose of ensuring public safety and preventing radiation-related disasters arising from the development and use of radiation technology and nuclear energy. Individual laws regulating the risks associated with the public’s direct choice to use radiation include the Safety Management Rules for Diagnostic X-ray Equipment delegated under the Medical Service Act and the regulations on the safety management of veterinary diagnostic X-ray equipment delegated under the Veterinary Act [55–57]. They do not establish an independent regulatory authority by law for the measurement, assessment, and determination of radiation risks, although these two laws allow public access and voluntary use of radiation-based services. Regulatory orders in the form of administrative rules may sometimes have a mismatch between their formal and substantive nature. For the same equipment, the Nuclear Safety Act regulates it through legislation, while the Medical Service Act and the Veterinary Act regulate it through enforcement rules. Radiation is classified into artificial radiation and natural radiation based on its scientific state. However, it is only defined in the Nuclear Safety Act and is not defined in other individual laws, which causes confusion regarding the scope of regulation. Due to these reasons, a review of administrative rules set by regulatory agencies reveals an imbalance in the interpretation of radiation risks in practice (Table 1).
2) Low-level risks: laws related to the management of naturally occurring radioactive materials
To manage the relatively low radiation risks associated with naturally occurring radioactive materials in the environment, individual laws such as the Drinking Water Management Act, the Indoor Air Quality Management Act, the Agricultural and Fishery Product Quality Control Management Act, the Marine Environment Management Act, and the Act on Protective Action Guidelines against Radiation in the Natural Environment impose relatively weak regulations. The Drinking Water Management Act serves as the legal basis for measuring tritium in order to prevent public health risks associated with drinking water and to ensure the rational management of water quality for consumption. Its purpose is to contribute to improving public health by effectively managing the quality and hygiene of drinking water [58]. The Indoor Air Quality Management Act serves as the legal basis for measuring radon, a radioactive substance, in order to systematically and efficiently manage air quality in underground living spaces. The purpose of this Act is to protect public health and prevent environmental risks by adequately maintaining and controlling indoor air quality in public-use facilities, newly built multi-family housing, and public transportation vehicles [59]. The Agricultural and Fishery Products Quality Control Act measures radioactive substances in order to establish a more comprehensive and systematic system for the quality control of agricultural and fishery products, including strengthening the safety inspection system. The purpose of this Act is to contribute to increasing the income of farmers and fishermen and protecting consumers by securing the safety of agricultural and fishery products, improving their merchantable quality, and facilitating fair and transparent trade through appropriate quality control [60]. The Marine Environment Management Act serves as the legal basis for the integrated management of radioactive substances that enter or are generated in the marine environment, with the aim of creating a clean and safe marine environment. The purpose of this Act is to prescribe necessary measures for the prevention, improvement, response, and recovery concerning marine pollution by managing sources of pollutants, thereby contributing to the protection of the health and wealth of the people of the Republic of Korea [61]. The Act on Protective Action Guidelines against Radiation in the Natural Environment aims to improve the quality of life of citizens and contribute to public safety by establishing a safety management system for radiation exposure in the living environment. The purpose of this Act is to protect citizens’ health and the environment, improve the quality of life, and contribute to public safety by providing guidelines for the safety control of radiation to which citizens may be exposed in their daily lives [62]. This Act was enacted following the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
The reason why regulations on low risks are continuously discussed is that even small changes can escalate into significant risks, potentially endangering lives or property. Additionally, the preferences and perceptions of society’s members regarding risks may evolve over time. Following the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, there was a significant increase in public concerns regarding radiation risks, with numerous complaints from stakeholders. In particular, when social issues such as radon contamination in mattresses and the detection of radiation in seafood arose, public attention to radiation risks intensified [63]. As a result, public concern leads to discussions about acceptable risk thresholds. Consequently, the permissible levels of radiation are sometimes adjusted to lower limits due to political intervention, which takes into account the concerns of voters rather than decisions based solely on scientific judgment. So, more stringent regulations are increasing [64]. Regulatory agencies obtain information on risks through investigation and monitoring of low-risk situations and subsequently identify potential risks or instances of non-compliance with regulations. Administrative measures are also utilized to explore regulatory approaches for risk management [65]. However, a key characteristic of these individual laws is that they do not specify the determination of risk magnitude, the validity of measurements, or the establishment of specialized organizations or committees for risk assessment within the legal framework (Table 2).
3) Low accident rate but relatively high-level risks: laws related to radiation disasters
Nuclear power plants are more strictly regulated under the Nuclear Safety Act during normal operations, with higher-level regulations, compared to the radiation risk controls imposed by other individual laws. However, as seen in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 accident on April 26, 1986, and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident on March 11, 2011, both of which were classified as the highest level on the International Nuclear Event Scale, accidents of this magnitude cause significant harm to both human beings and the environment and pose considerable challenges for recovery. For this reason, although the accident rate is low, in the event of a disaster or accident at a nuclear power plant, which is regulated at a high level under the Nuclear Safety Act, the response is managed through individual laws systematically linked to the Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency, the Framework Act on Disaster and Safety Management, and the Anti-Terrorism Act for the Protection of Citizens and Public Safety. The physical protection system regulated by the Act on Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency is aimed at assessing potential threats to nuclear facilities and radioactive materials, including nuclear materials, in advance, and maintaining a response system. The purpose of this Act is to protect the life and property of citizens by establishing a physical protection system and a system for preventing radiological and nuclear disasters, ensuring the safe management and operation of nuclear materials and facilities, and establishing management systems to efficiently cope with radioactive and nuclear disasters that may occur both inside and outside the territory of the Republic of Korea [66]. Physical protection measures are proactive preventive actions, while radiological emergency preparedness is a distinct field within national disaster management, rather than nuclear control [67]. In the event of an accident like the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster, where the reactor containment building is damaged and fission products are released, the response, according to radiological emergency preparedness, requires not only nuclear engineering expertise but also the involvement of professionals from various fields such as medicine, firefighting, communications, environmental science, radiation protection, public relations, and psychology [25]. Radiological disasters involve the specific risks of widespread radioactive contamination or radiation exposure, requiring the involvement of specialized administrative agencies. However, when a radiological disaster occurs, the response should not be limited to the issue of radiation exposure; rather, all functions must be activated from a national disaster management perspective. Radiological disaster response requires the activation of all possible defense systems, making it preferable to handle such incidents within the disaster management framework of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. The Framework Act on Disaster and Safety Management is linked only to the Nuclear Safety Act and does not appear to be connected to other individual laws that regulate radiation risks. It is necessary to supplement the framework so that all relevant individual laws and competent authorities can respond to radiological disasters [68]. The Anti-Terrorism Act for the Protection of Citizens and Public Safety was enacted to safeguard the lives and property of citizens and to ensure national and public security against terrorism. This Act stipulates necessary provisions for terrorism prevention, counter-terrorism activities, and compensation for damages resulting from terrorist acts (Table 3) [69].
3. Laws on Administrative Organizations Related to Radiation Risk Regulation
The individual laws related to radiation risk regulation are managed by various ministries such as the Ministry of Science and ICT, the Ministry of Trade, the Industry and Energy, Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, the Ministry of Employment and Labor, and the National Intelligence Service. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety primarily manage radiation risks related to the Nuclear Safety Act and the Act on Protection Action Guidelines against Radiation in the Natural Environment. The legal basis for the establishment of central administrative agencies is founded on Article 66, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution, and the principle of administrative organization being determined by law, as stipulated in Article 96 of the Constitution [70]. Accordingly, Article 2 of the Government Organization Act provides the legal foundation for the establishment and organization of central administrative agencies, leading to the establishment of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. The principle of administrative organization being determined by law aims to exclude arbitrary control by administrators or politicians by stipulating the establishment, organization, and scope of duties of administrative organizations in law [71]. This aligns with the legal reservation principle of the rule of law.
Individual laws governing administrative organizations responsible for radiation risk regulation include the Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety Act. These laws establish the legal framework for regulatory bodies, defining their roles, responsibilities, and operational structures to ensure effective radiation safety oversight and enforcement. These two individual laws function exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission.
The purpose of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission is to protect people from the risks of radioactive disasters in the generation and use of nuclear energy and to contribute to public safety and environmental conservation by establishing the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission [72]. The purpose of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety Act is to establish the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety as a dedicated technical expert organization for nuclear safety regulation, thereby protecting the public from radiation disasters arising from the production and utilization of nuclear energy and contributing to public safety and environmental conservation [73]. Apart from the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, which oversees the Nuclear Safety Act, other government departments responsible for individual laws do not have legal definitions regarding the conceptual framework for radiation risk assessment criteria or radiation measurement methods. Several government departments responsible for radiation risk regulation are measuring and regulating radiation in a situation where there is a lack of a legal foundation for risk management tools (Table 4).
The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission’s legitimacy as an independent administrative agency is founded on the core elements of independence and expertise [74]. The decision-making structure of administrative organizations directly influences administrative actions. Therefore, an administrative organization that is suitable for the nature and purpose of administrative tasks is essential for ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of administrative actions [75]. This is necessary to protect citizens’ rights and achieve the efficiency of administrative work [76]. In South Korea, there is no administrative department that comprehensively oversees radiation risk regulation, and there is no fundamental law in place. As a result, there are limitations in the administrative system for implementing a consistent and comprehensive national radiation risk regulation policy, leading to imbalances in radiation protection standards across individual laws related to radiation risk regulation. There is no clear legal regulation regarding risk management for measuring natural radioactive nuclides across the various administrative departments. As radiation levels are measured at the discretion of administrative authorities, the risk thresholds vary, leading to confusion in risk assessments. For example, the Ministry of Environment sets the management standard for radon in ambient air at 148 Bq/m3, while the Ministry of Employment and Labor sets a different standard of 600 Bq/m3 for radon in workplace air. Another example is the measurement of tritium in drinking water, where the Ministry of Environment sets the management standard for saline groundwater at 6 Bq/L, while the World Health Organization sets the standard at 10,000 Bq/L. These differences in standards are based more on the discretion of the respective ministries than on scientific evidence, influencing the establishment of radiation risk thresholds in air and drinking water, which directly affect public health. Immediately after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, a representative independent agency regulating radiation risks, officially declared that the measured radiation levels in fish were within safe limits. However, the interpretation of radiation risk was not unified among the administrative agencies responsible for importing Japanese fish, measuring and managing radiation levels, and communicating risks to the public. Additionally, discrepancies in media reports further contributed to public confusion. The radiation risk regulation systems, definitions of concepts, and risk assessments in each individual law are significantly imbalanced, leading to ongoing social conflicts.
The scope of legislation exercised by the legislative and executive branches within the entire body of national legal norms, including both parliamentary legislation and administrative legislation, varies depending on practical circumstances. As the abstraction of parliamentary legislation increases, the scope of administrative legislation tends to expand, and conversely, as the specificity of parliamentary legislation increases, the scope of administrative legislation narrows. When the scope of administrative legislation broadens, it may result in the executive branch exercising discretion over legislation that affects the rights and duties of citizens, leading to the potential abuse of executive power, as such legislation is not enacted by the people’s representative body [77]. In practice, while laws and regulations include provisions granting administrative agencies the authority to establish administrative rules, the actual content often extends beyond the scope of the authorization, encompassing extensive standards, procedures, and other details [78]. In principle, administrative rules do not have external binding force and do not possess the nature of laws. A violation of an administrative rule does not, by itself, constitute an unlawful administrative action, and the legality of a decision must be assessed based on laws and other regulations. However, there is a view that a violation of an administrative rule may influence the final decision in some way, thereby affecting the legality of the administrative action [79]. Every law has an administrative organization responsible for its enforcement, and each law has its own established system and practices for interpretation and application. The missions and objectives of the relevant administrative organizations also differ. When individual laws and administrative organizations overlap around a single technology, product, or service, it creates an environment where conflicts are likely to arise frequently [65]. There is also a need for institutional mechanisms that allow administrative agencies to operate independently, without interference from regulated industries, institutions using radiation technology, research and development companies, relevant government ministries overseeing radiation risk regulation, political organizations, and specific-purpose civil society groups.
4. Laws Related to the Nuclear Safety Act
1) Laws related to the restoration, compensation, and support for radiation risk damage
There are several laws and regulations concerning the compensation, support, and recovery from the damages caused by radiation risks (Table 5). These include the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Nuclear Liability, the Nuclear Compensation Contract Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, the Act on Assistance to Electric Power Plants–Neighboring Areas, and the Special Act on Assistance to the Locations of Facilities for Disposal of Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste. In the case of state compensation, there is a clear general legal principle that damages arising from unlawful actions of the state shall be compensated [80]. Damages or infringements resulting from advanced scientific and technological developments cannot be treated uniformly due to their distinct characteristics, such as cause, scale, and nature. Infringements may result in immediate harm, such as physical injury or property damage, or may manifest as delayed damages accumulated over an extended period. Industries related to the utilization of science and technology inherently carry unpredictable risks and potential damages. For this reason, South Korea addresses nuclear damage by enacting the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Nuclear Liability, the Nuclear Compensation Contract Act, which introduce strict liability, considering the unique characteristics of nuclear damage. The Act on Indemnity Agreements for Nuclear Liability was enacted to establish a compensation system for victims in the event of nuclear damage caused by the operation of nuclear reactors, with the aims of protecting victims and ensuring the sound development of the nuclear industry. It recognizes the strict liability of nuclear operators and allows the operator to seek recourse through a right of indemnity after initially compensating for damages caused by a third party’s intentional or negligent actions [81]. The Act on Assistance to Electric Power Plants–Neighboring Areas was enacted to address the fact that, while power generation projects are essential for national living standards and economic development, the development effects on neighboring areas are minimal relative to the large scale of the projects. Additionally, due to issues such as safety concerns, local residents often raise collective grievances. The law aims to foster cooperative relationships with the local community in order to resolve collective grievances, secure suitable locations for power plant construction, and ensure the stable supply of electricity [82]. The Special Act on Assistance to the Locations of Facilities for Disposal of Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste was enacted to facilitate the construction of facilities for the safe and efficient disposal of low-level radioactive waste. The purpose of the law is to establish a support system for these regions, contributing to ‘regional development’ and the ‘improvement of residents’ quality of life [83].
2) Laws related to enhancing public trust and communication on radiation risks
Laws related to enhancing public trust and citizen participation in radiation risk management include the Act on the Control and Supervision on Nuclear Power Supplies, etc. for the Prevention of Corruption in the Nuclear Power Industry, the Act on Nuclear Safety Information Disclosure and Communication.
The purpose of the Act on the Control and Supervision on Nuclear Power Supplies, etc. for the Prevention of Corruption in the Nuclear Power Industry is to create a sound foundation for the nuclear power industry by prescribing matters concerning obligations with which nuclear power suppliers, etc. should comply while engaging in business and the Government’s control and supervision thereover [84]. The purpose of the Act on Nuclear Safety Information Disclosure and Communication is to guarantee the right of citizens to know and to promote their trust in nuclear safety by prescribing matters concerning the disclosure and communication of information related to nuclear safety [85]. Disclosure should ensure accessibility for all individuals in the consultation and decision-making processes, and the content must be thoroughly communicated. The consultation and decision-making processes of consensus-based independent regulatory bodies, such as the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, should be sufficiently disclosed to the general public, enabling individuals who are not directly involved to monitor the relevant matters [86].
3) Laws related to the risks of nuclear power facilities
Laws related to the safety of nuclear power generation include the Electrical Construction Business Act, the Building Act, the Framework Act on Firefighting Services, and the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, all of which intersect with the Nuclear Safety Act and are linked to the risk management of nuclear power plants. These four individual laws were enacted to apply to fields other than radiation technology and nuclear power generation. These individual laws regulate safety-related matters and share certain objectives regarding the safety of nuclear power plants. However, in relation to the nuclear sector, the Nuclear Safety Act incorporates the provisions of these laws.
The Electrical Construction Business Act is a law that prescribes the fundamental framework for the electricity business. It stipulates that safety regulations for reactor facilities fall under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Safety Act. The purpose of this Act is to promote the sound development of the electrical construction business and to ensure the safe and appropriate execution of electrical construction projects by establishing basic provisions concerning the electrical construction business, as well as the execution, technical management, and contracting of electrical construction [87]. The Building Act provides regulations related to general building standards. When constructing a reactor facility, the pre-approval of the site under the Nuclear Safety Act is required, and in such cases, building permits are deemed to be granted. The purposes of this Act are to improve the safety, functionality, environment, and aesthetic value of buildings, as well as to promote public welfare by establishing standards for the use of sites, structures, and facilities of buildings [88]. The Framework Act on Firefighting Services provides regulations related to fire prevention, vigilance, and suppression. Among its provisions, the safety management requirements for flammable substances include radioactive materials. The purpose of this Act is to prevent, take precautions against, or suppress fires and to safeguard the lives, physical health, and property of citizens by providing rescue and first-aid services during fires, calamities, disasters, and other emergency situations. In doing so, it contributes to maintaining public peace and order and promoting public welfare [89]. The Environmental Impact Assessment Act regulates the scope and procedure of environmental impact assessments. For radiation effects, such assessments are carried out in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. The purpose of this Act is to promote environmentally friendly, sustainable development and ensure a healthy and pleasant life for citizens by forecasting and assessing the environmental impacts of a plan or project and by formulating measures for environmental conservation when a plan or project with potential environmental impacts is formulated and implemented [90]. These individual laws complement the safety of nuclear power plants; however, they are not linked to other laws regulating radiation risks, aside from the Nuclear Safety Act.
5. Laws Related to the Promotion of Radiation Technology and Nuclear Power Utilization
Promotion and safety regulation are organically interconnected. Laws related to the promotion and development of radiation technology and nuclear power include the Nuclear Energy Promotion Act, the Radiation and Radioisotope Use Promotion Act, the Non-Destructive Testing Act, the Fusion Energy Development Promotion Act, and the Radioactive Waste Management Act. These four individual laws are enacted and operated with the purpose of promoting and developing these fields [2, 91–94]. Regarding the regulation of radiation risks related to the five individual laws on promotion, only the Nuclear Safety Act is linked. Other individual laws related to radiation risk regulation, apart from the Nuclear Safety Act, lack laws and systems related to promotion and development. One of the causes of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan was the organizational structure and administrative culture of the nuclear regulatory system, which did not functionally separate promotion and regulation [95]. It is also important to review the five individual laws related to the promotion of radiation technology and nuclear power to ensure that they do not violate the principle of avoiding excessive infringement (Table 6).
Discussion
Regulation should be differentiated based on the level of risk. When the risk is significant and the likelihood of occurrence is high, strong regulations should be applied. Conversely, when the risk is minimal and the probability of occurrence is low, less stringent regulations may be appropriate [65]. In this context, a determination must be made as to what constitutes a significant or minor risk. When assessing radiation risk levels, one must consider questions such as: Is the radiation risk from a nuclear power plant reactor more dangerous? Is the radiation used in oncology for cancer treatment more hazardous? Is the radiation from sterilization facilities more dangerous? Is the radiation used in diagnostic imaging across medical institutions for the general population more harmful? Or is the radiation emitted from non-destructive testing equipment, which is used across the country, more dangerous? These considerations are critical in determining the level of regulatory intervention required. The risks of ionizing radiation do not have a unified risk standard [96]. From another perspective, in the relationship between radiation exposure and human impact, is the diagnostic radiation exposure at medical institutions, which is used by all citizens, more dangerous? Is the radiation exposure from cancer treatment in oncology more harmful? Is the exposure from portable high-level non-destructive testing equipment more hazardous? Is the tritiated water consumed by residents near the Wolseong nuclear power plant more dangerous? Is the radiation exposure for workers managing security scanners at airport checkpoints riskier? Is the cosmic radiation that airline crew members receive during high-altitude flights more dangerous? Is the consumption of fish imported from Fukushima, containing cesium, more harmful to consumers?
In conclusion, when determining the risk levels of radiation exposure sources and their impact on human health, there may be significant disagreements regarding the assessment of risk. The reason for this is that there are practical issues, such as gaps in the understanding of the concepts and technical expertise, depending on the radiation risk sources, the parties that need protection from radiation risks, and the regulatory authorities responsible for radiation risk. Additionally, there has been relatively little effort in legal terms to clarify the essence of radiation risk, radiation accidents, and radiation harm. Furthermore, this is due to the limitations arising from the fact that the concepts have primarily evolved through the recommendations of international organizations and within specialized academic fields.
The legal definition of radiation is specified only in some individual laws. The legal meanings of radiation safety and radiation risk have not been clearly established by law. Important concepts such as radiation risk, radiation safety, radiation harm, and radiation injury are only theoretically interpreted within the realm of scientific and technical experts. In the current legal system, key terms related to radiation risk are not legally defined. From a legal perspective, interpretation, application, and enforcement of the law are carried out through the definition of terms, so the absence of clear definitions and concepts presents a significant issue. Radiation risks have led to significant social issues, such as the bankruptcy of a company producing beds due to radon risk, school closures caused by radioactive contamination concerns, and business losses in the fisheries industry due to the risks associated with radioactive mackerel. These events have resulted in direct harm and losses to the general public. It is believed that these incidents are the result of a combination of complex issues, including the lack of a clear definition of radiation risk, the determination of risk magnitude, the expertise of relevant government agencies, and the limitations of risk assessment.
The ICRP explains that the term ‘radiation source’ can refer to the physical causes or procedures that can cause measurable radiation exposure to individuals or groups. Radiation sources include physical radiation sources such as radioactive materials or X-ray devices, facilities such as hospitals or nuclear power plants, and environmental radiation or nuclear medicine in hospitals. When radioactive materials are released into the environment, the entire facility can be considered a radiation source. If radioactive materials have spread, the areas where people are exposed can be regarded as a single radiation source. For specific individuals, radiation sources requiring protective measures from radiation exposure must be addressed individually [97].
In the ICRP recommendations, it is considered best to exclude radiation sources that are inherently uncontrollable, such as cosmic radiation or potassium-40 in the body [98]. The decision regarding which radiation exposures should be regulated requires the judgment of each country’s lawmakers and may be influenced by cultural perceptions. The scope of excluded radiation sources is managed through the IAEA’s BSS, which ensures that exposures that cannot be controlled or are inherently difficult to manage are excluded from the BSS standards [99]. In radiation risk regulation, there are two types of radiation exposures that may be excluded: those that are uncontrollable and those that are inherently difficult to manage. Uncontrollable exposures include those such as radiation from potassium-40 in the body, which maintains homeostasis and cannot be restricted by regulatory measures in any state [98].
The ICRP points out that the approach to laws and regulations varies across jurisdictions, and in some countries, it is difficult or impossible to exclude certain radiation sources altogether. Regardless of the regulatory approach adopted to manage various types of radiation exposure situations, the ICRP recommendations provide principles regarding the scope of regulatory requirements and the exclusion of certain sources. The application of regulatory control is expected to achieve a net benefit in terms of protection. If a net benefit is not achieved, regulatory control is not justified. If a net benefit is not achieved, regulatory control is not justified.
In South Korea, the focus is on specific radioactive materials highlighted in the media, rather than regulation based on the level of radiation (or radiation potential) risk, and infrastructure for measuring radiation is being developed by the relevant authorities according to the issue. In contrast, there is a lack of sufficient foundation for the revision of laws related to radiation risk regulation and for regulatory impact assessments. The determination and judgment of radiation risk require a high level of expertise, so the administrative organization must ensure both its professional capacity and procedural legitimacy. Agencies regulating radiation risks should secure specialized personnel capable of making scientifically complex and technical judgments and utilize them in their work. The regulatory body should not be reliant on delegating decisions to multiple external committees or on one-time external consultations.
To strengthen the role and responsibility of the executive branch, specific standards for universal risk management should be proposed [100]. Therefore, risks that are unacceptable should be prohibited, while for other risks, the executive branch must request additional safety information and make individual judgments on each case. As seen in the Nuclear Safety Act, it is necessary to provide certain standards or guidelines to ensure consistent application of principle-based regulation. However, this should not be excessive, and regulatory bodies should not penalize minor mistakes of the regulated entities [101]. Radiation risk regulation should combine both regulation and support. Before imposing controls, efforts should be made to strengthen capacities, and only then should legal enforcement be considered [65]. In summary, to address these issues, although a comprehensive reform of the legal system may be required, diagnosing and supplementing the structural coherence of the individual laws related to radiation risk regulation would lead to the achievement of legal effectiveness, the enhancement of administrative expertise, and the establishment of legal principles.
Conclusion
The Nuclear Safety Act, compared to other relevant statutes, clearly defines the scope of regulation for high-level radiation risks within the systematic framework of radiation risk regulations. However, with the establishment of the Act on Protection Action Guidelines against Radiation in the Natural Environment in 2011, the scope of radiation risk regulation was expanded to cover areas that were excluded from the ‘Nuclear Safety Act.’ As a result, the scope of radiation risk regulation has been broadened.
This raises concerns about the violation of the principle of excessive infringement rather than the principle of insufficient protection. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully assess the application of the principle of proportionality to ensure that the level of protection is neither excessive nor inadequate, balancing public safety with individual rights. For instance, in the case of the ‘Nuclear Safety Act,’ which regulates relatively high levels of radiation risks, the law mandates the use of personal dosimeters for all workers entering radiation-controlled areas. This allows for the monitoring of individual radiation exposure and potential harm to the human body, enabling proactive prevention without significant controversy. However, the risks posed by diagnostic radiation devices in medical institutions and radon exposure in homes and workplaces are not regulated by the ‘Nuclear Safety Act.’ As a result, it becomes challenging to assess individual radiation risks and potential harm, leading to potential controversy in terms of ensuring adequate protection.
In South Korea, when national issues related to radiation risks arise, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, an institution outside the jurisdiction of the relevant authorities, often takes action in assessing and addressing these risks. This has led to a situation where administrative actions fail to fulfill the functions required in a rule-of-law state. There seems to be a lack of systematic integration of individual laws related to radiation risk regulation, as well as the absence of a cohesive radiation protection policy, management standards, and effective collaboration and coordination among administrative bodies. Moreover, the current laws regulating natural radioactive materials exhibit several challenges, including limitations in epidemiological studies on radiation risk impacts, issues related to the application of the linear no-threshold hypothesis, restrictions on expert participation, and a general lack of understanding regarding radiation risk regulation frameworks. These challenges highlight the necessity of restructuring into a comprehensive and specialized organization or institution capable of integrated measurement, assessment, and management of radiation risks.
In South Korea, there are various types of committees. Advisory committees are regulated by Article 5 of the ‘Act on the Installation and Operation of Committees Belonging to Administrative Agencies,’ which sets the requirements for establishing such committees [102]. These committees merely serve to provide ‘expert opinions’ to administrative agencies and assist in deliberation, coordination, and consultation, thereby supporting the decision-making process of these agencies. Regarding radiation risk regulation, the committee should be composed of experts capable of accurately measuring, evaluating, and determining high-level radiation risks. Alternatively, the decision-making process should be supplemented by a secretariat or specialized advisory committees to ensure that decisions are made based on professional expertise. To ensure the professionalism of the regulatory framework for radiation risk, two recommendations can be made.
First, if the ‘Nuclear Safety Act’ functions as a fundamental law, the administrative organizations specified in this law would be able to perform functions such as risk determination, management, and judgment under the principles of a rule-of-law state, in relation to the individual laws regulating radiation risks.
Second, if it is not feasible for the ‘Nuclear Safety Act’ to serve as the fundamental law, the normative systems within the individual laws regulating radiation risks must be improved to enable them to perform standardized functions for risk determination, management, and judgment. The most crucial aspect is that the practical independence of safety regulation must not be compromised and that scientific and technological judgment in risk assessments should be prioritized. To ensure this, regulations and organizational structures should be established that guarantee the proper functioning of these processes.
In conclusion, although a revolutionary overhaul of the legal system may be required to resolve these issues, diagnosing and supplementing the systemic coherence of individual laws related to radiation risk regulation would lead to the achievement of legal efficacy, the securing of expertise within administrative agencies, and the establishment of legal principles.
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